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"BLACK Box

DECISIONS" ON LIFE OR
DEATH-IF THEY'RE ARBITRARY,

DON'T BLAME THE JURY:

A

REPLY TO

JUDGE PATRICK HIGGINBOTHAM'
Vivian Berger*
INTRODUCTION

AUTHOR OR jurist, Judge Higginbotham has previously
treated both the jury2 and the death penalty' and, on occasion,
5
their intersection.' In Judge Higginbotham's work on civil juries
as well as the preface to his present essay, he recognizes the critical role of nonprofessional decision makers as a check upon judicial power and a conduit for societal values in the context of specific cases. The criminal jury, Judge Higginbotham notes, has also
served important functions as a global buffer between the defendant and the government ("the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor"
in addition to "the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge") 6 and as
a vehicle of local control. Finally, in the capital setting, juries "exA

S

* Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Columbia University School of Law. This piece
draws heavily on the insights of my colleague, James S. Liebman, with whom I have been
participating in a student-run death penalty workshop. As always, it also reflects my own
and my friends' experience, acquired in litigating capital cases.
1. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CAsE W. Ras. L. REV. 1047
(1991) [hereinafter Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty]; see Higginbotham,
Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L.
REv.47, 56 (1977) [hereinafter Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue] ("By the term
'black box decisions' I mean the difficult decisions that remain arbitrary in the sense that
they can only be based on the specific equities of each individual case and cannot
convincingly be explained on wholly logical or rational grounds.").
2. See Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue, supra note 1.
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on which Judge Higginbotham sits, hears numerous capital habeas cases. One of its constituent states, Texas, has
the largest death row in the nation. See NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., Death Row, USA 31 (Jan. 21, 1991) (332 death-row inmates).
4. See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 389 (5th Cir. 1983) (Higginbotham,
J., concurring).
5. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue, supra note 1, at 58.
6. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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press the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of
7
life or death."
It is therefore not surprising, to use the judge's own words, to
find a broad consensus in the United States that this charged task
should be performed "by a group of citizens, because a group better represents community values and because responsibility for
such a decision is best shared." 8 What is initially surprising,
though, given his seemingly strong commitment to the jury, is his
willingness to retreat from that allegiance where it arguably
counts the most-in capital sentencing. In particular, the judge
takes no position on whether a trial court or a jury should fix the
penalty and suggests that the court should at least identify deatheligible persons as a threshold determination to selection of the
actual sentence by jurors.'
On closer examination, however, Judge Higginbotham's ambivalence about the institution of jury sentencing in capital cases
appears to flow not from distrust of the competency of lay people
but rather from the notion that juries operate by "gut-level
hunch," rendering determinations that are as impenetrable as a
black box. "For this reason," the judge believes, "in order to respond to perceptions that the death penalty is imposed in a capricious and irrational manner an inquiry such as this must focus on
the jury. The jury," he continues, "shapes the debate about reform, because in the final analysis the nature of the jury's decision
making cannot be changed."10 Yet his view of the imperviousness
of juries to more than minimal restraint and guidance results in
his virtually abandoning the goal of improving jury-based sentencing systems: "There is a point at which we must either accept the
irreducible core of discretion"-by which he apparently means

7. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). Under eighth amendment
doctrine, permissible punishments must "reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Id. at 519 n.15 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Accordingly, capital sentencing juries maintain not a one- but a twoway "link between contemporary community values and the penal system." Id. Like all
juries, they apply those values in arriving at particular verdicts. Id. Further, because the
courts use aggregate jury actions as evidence of whether challenged punishments in fact
conform to contemporary standards, these juries transmit collective "messages" that help
to shape the system itself over the years. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31
(1989); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982).
8. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1048.
9. I assess all of Judge Higginbotham's conclusions at the end of this Reply. See
infra text accompanying notes 126-43.
10. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1049.
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some mix of irrationality and subjectivity"-"inherent in the
function of juries12or confess that we do not want juries making the
decision at all."
I defer to no one in the firmness of my conviction that arbitrariness, as well as innumerable other problems, will dog the administration of death so long as we in this country pursue the mis-

guided "effort[] to 'execute" justice."' 3 But that being said, it
seems possible to fashion capital punishment systems less whimsical in operation than many of the post-Furman" constructs tolerated by the Supreme Court. Even more to the point, in light of
Judge Higginbotham's basic thesis concerning the limitations of
juries, I believe that he wrongly conflates the disparate phenomena of arbitrary sentencing and jury sentencing: the former will
endure regardless of whether we restrict the latter.' 5 Secondarily,
he tacitly overrates the relative advantages of judges in avoiding
caprice"0 while underestimating jurors' abilities (in my opinion,
real if modest) to be guided by carefully drafted instructions
designed to explain and control their discretion. If I am right,
moving toward greater judicial involvement in the penalty determination will yield scant gain for the general process while simultaneously harming defendants who wish to appeal to "the com-

11. See generally Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue, supra note 1, at 56 (defining "black box" decision making). The word "discretion" has many connotations. See
Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269
(1984). For example, insofar as the term implies "personal input," id. at 279, or even some
"latitude of choice and action," see THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 376 (1969), its existence does not necessarily threaten the integrity of
capital sentencing. But cf. Fletcher, supra, at 279 (one meaning of discretion is "the power
to get away with alternative decisions"). In any event, because judges possess these types of
discretion too, the concept provides no meaningful distinction between jury and trial court
sentencing. See infra text accompanying notes 97-107.
12. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1056.
13. Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals
to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665, 1713 (1990) [hereinafter Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?]; see Berger, Born-Again Death (Book
Review), 87 CoLum. L REV. 1301, 1324 (1987) [hereinafter Berger, Born-Again Death].
See generally C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981) (the death penalty should be opposed because of the possibility of
mistake and the arbitrariness of the jurors' decision).
14. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15. Notably, in the civil context, the judge has resisted blaming the jury for flaws in
the administration of justice. See, e.g., Higginbotham, Continuingthe Dialogue,supra note
1, at 53 ("The problems of protracted litigation cannot readily be couched simply in terms
of jury trial versus bench trial.").
16. But cf. id. at 56 ("All judicial decisions ultimately reflect a certain
arbitrariness.").
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mon-sense judgment of a jury" instead of "to the more tutored
but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge.""7
In the remainder of this essay, I develop several themes suggested by Juries and the Death Penalty. First, I intend to survey
the progress and ultimate regression of death penalty jurisprudence in the two decades since McGautha v. California.8 My focus will be on the launching of the doctrines enjoining both
nonarbitrariness and individualization in sentencing, with the ultimate goal of discussing the fate of these "'twin objectives.' "19
With that background, I will be able to comment more usefully on
Judge Higginbotham's conclusions; predictably, these flow largely
from his views of the jury. My recommendations accord with his
to a certain extent but differ in some significant respects. In addition, I offer a few reforms that the judge's piece does not propose.
I.

REGULATION AND RETREAT: THE RISE AND FALL OF

FURMAN'S EMPIRE

A. Away from McGautha
For present purposes, McGautha's holding that wholly discretionary jury sentencing in capital cases does not violate due process needs no further adumbration. It does, however, bear mention
that in the companion decision to McGautha, Crampton v. Ohio,
the Court also sustained the constitutional validity of a single proceeding on guilt and punishment. 20 This format, then common although rejected by California (McGautha himself had enjoyed a
bifurcated procedure), compounded the problem of standardless
sentencing by limiting the proof available on penalty to that which
17. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). In a number of decisions, the
Supreme Court has made clear that capital defendants do not have a constitutional right to
jury sentencing. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3054 (1990); Hildwin v.
Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). But more than

three-quarters of death penalty jurisdictions afford this right as a statutory matter. See
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 463-64 n.9 (collecting statutes); Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U.
PA. L. REv.1, 14 (1980) [hereinafter Gillers, Deciding Who Dies]; id. at 101-19 (collecting

statutes). Academic commentary has been critical of the Court's jurisprudence in this area.
See, e.g., Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: ConstitutionalAccuracy at the Selection Stage of
CapitalSentencing, 18 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 1037, 1084-95 (1985) [hereinafter Gillers, The
Quality of Mercy]; Poulos, Liability Rules, Sentencing Factors,and the Sixth Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial: A Preliminary Inquiry, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 643, 722-30 (1990).
18. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
19. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459-60 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
110-11 (1982)).
20. 402 U.S. 183, 218-20 (1971).
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the parties chose to present on the threshold question of guilt or
innocence.21 In many instances, the trial on guilt contained no testimony by the accused. Such testimony would have been useful as
a vehicle for mitigating evidence or mercy pleas-yet risky because it invited impeachment, especially by his previous record,
and often necessarily conceded his commission of the crimes
charged. This tension caused the most poignant of prisoner's dilemmas and combined with the total lack of punishment criteria
to yield doubly arbitrary sentences. Not only did that type of
scheme invite capricious decision making by failing to afford any
guidance; it also withheld the raw material, evidence specifically
relevant to penalty, to which standards might be applied to shape
a foundation for rational choice.
Judge Higginbotham fairly recounts the Court's swift spurning of McGautha in Furman v. Georgia2 2 and its attempt in the

Gregg v. Georgia quintet 23 and Lockett v Ohio24 to construct a
due process for death out of the void created by Furman. For several years, that effort mainly involved rejecting state endeavors to
read Furman's inscrutable tea leaves and to follow the sketchy
road map limned in the five subsequent opinions.25 The Court
carved out some zones of substantive immunity from death,26 extended certain guilt-phase protections to penalty hearings,27 and
engrafted upon the sentencing proceeding a series of unique safeguards meant to effectuate Woodson v. North Carolina'smandate

that death's difference from lesser punishments produces "a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination

21. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976).
22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
23. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (upholding Georgia's death penalty statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida's death penalty statute); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas's death penalty statute); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating North Carolina's death penalty statute); Roberts
(Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating Louisiana's death penalty
statute).
24. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
25. See supra note 23. Until the 1982 Term, the Court overturned the sentence of
death in all but one of the fully argued capital cases. The sole exception was Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
26. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death is disproportionate punishment for one who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing will occur or
that lethal force will be used); Coker v. Florida, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death is disproportionate punishment for the rape of an adult woman).
27. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (privilege against self-incrimination); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (double jeopardy).
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that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."2 8
Most important, the Gregg Court announced a commitment
to taming the arbitrary imposition of capital sentences while simultaneously assuring that mercy could be meted out "on the basis of factors too intangible to write into a statute."2 9 Disavowing
what seemed at least facially the "perfect response[]" to
Furman's concern (mandatory death for first-degree murders), 30
Gregg's companion decision, Woodson, employed the death-is-different principle to elevate individualized sentencing to a constitutional necessity: "We believe that in capital cases the fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."'3 Shortly thereafter, underscoring this aim to promote individualization, Lockett defined mitigating factors and the
obligation to allow their inclusion in the fateful calculus along the
extremely generous lines indicated earlier by the judge. 2 Concom-

28. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)
(capital defendant has right to deny or explain damaging allegations upon which sentencing judge will rely); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (trustworthy evidence offered by
defendant at penalty phase could not be excluded under otherwise valid hearsay rule).
29. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199; id. at 222 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
30. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1057. Notably,
however, the Court rejected mandatory death penalty statutes. Not only did they fall afoul
of the reliability-based principle of individualization in sentencing, see infra text accompanying notes 31-32 & 37-40, and evolving standards of decency, see Woodson, 428 U.S. at
288-302, but also they "simply papered over the problem of unguided and unchecked jury
discretion" since they lent themselves to nullification. Id. at 302. But see Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3067 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that mandatory imposition of the death penalty for traditionally capital offenses comports with the eighth amendment, rejecting as "conjecture" the theory that
"juries systematically disregard their oaths.").
31. 428 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted). In a third accompanying decision, the Court
declined to distinguish Louisiana's mandatory law on the ground that it contained a somewhat narrower definition of first-degree murder than North Carolina's. See Roberts
(Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 330-32 (1976). Several times, the Court expressly
reserved the issue whether a mandatory death sentence could be justified in the case of an
inmate convicted of murder while serving a sentence of life imprisonment. See, e.g., Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 n.5 (1977). In 1987, Sumner v. Shuman, 483
U.S. 66 (1987), answered this question in the negative.
32. "[T]he sentencer may 'not be precluded from considering as a mitigatingfactor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.'" 438 U.S. at 604
(emphasis in original), quoted in Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note
1, at 1057. Although only a plurality joined the opinion in Lockett, five justices endorsed it
four years later in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105 (1982).
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itantly, to limit caprice in capital punishment, Gregg endorsed, if
it did not expressly command, 33 a separate trial on the penalty
issue "at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with
standards to guide the use of the information."3 4
But the Georgia system upheld in Gregg channeled the jury's
discretion minimally-mandating only that jurors be instructed on
the need to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, a single statutory
aggravating circumstance. After surmounting that hurdle, a jury
could consider any other appropriate aggravating or mitigating
factor in deciding whether to return a verdict of life or death. The
sole additional protection against the wanton or freakish capital
sentence35 (mentioned approvingly by the Court) was automatic
appellate review by the Georgia Supreme Court, which featured
an inquiry into the penalty's proportionality as compared with
sentences in similar cases. 36
What has happened over the years as the Court has dealt
with numerous claims of violation of the tenet of either nonarbitrariness or individualization? Simply put, until last Term 7 the
Justices adhered to the second principle with great consistency,
sometimes even expanding its reach, 38 to the point where one
could confidently predict that at least five members of the Court
would vote to eradicate any barrier to the sentencer's ability to
"consider fully" and "give effect" to the defendant's mitigating
evidence. 9 Thus, for example, in invalidating instructions and a
verdict form that may have been construed by jurors to bar their
taking into account any mitigating circumstance not unanimously
found by the group, Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority in
Mills v. Maryland:

Under our decisions, it is not relevant whether the barrier to the
sentencer's consideration of all mitigating evidence is interposed
by statute, Lockett v. Ohio, supra; Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481

33.

See 428 U.S at 195; see also Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 S. CTr. Rav.

305, 321 (Gregg did not require anything; all it did was sustain a statute).
34. 428 U.S. at 195.
35. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
36. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303 (1987); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195-96,
206. See generally Weisberg, supra note 33, at 320 ("classical" account of 1976 cases
would stress very little that Court did, as opposed to great deal it appeared to say).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 65-86.
38. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (defendant's positive

adjustment to prison after the crime deemed relevant mitigating evidence).
39. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323 (1989).
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U.S. 393 (1987); by the sentencing court, Eddings v.
Oklahoma, supra; or by an evidentiary ruling, Skipper v. South

Carolina,supra. The same must be true with respect to a single
juror's holdout vote against finding the presence of a mitigating
circumstance. .

.

. "Because the [sentencer's] failure to con-

sider all of the mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of
the death sentence, in plain violation of Lockett, it is our duty to
remand this case for resentencing. ' 40

The first principle, enjoining avoidance of unbridled discretion and capriciousness in inflicting death, has sustained very different treatment. Oft-repeated, it has been honored more in the
breach than in the observance.41 To that subject I now turn.
B.

Back to McGautha

As Judge Higginbotham relates, Justice Harlan in McGautha
v. California declared a deep-rooted skepticism that the sentencer's discretion in capital cases could be channeled in a meaningful fashion: "To identify before the fact those charateristics of
criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which
can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority,
appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability."4 In
Gregg, the Court took up his challenge, stating "that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter as grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared,
that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. ' 43 But as I
previously indicated, the Georgia system given the plurality's imprimatur actually appeared to require little by way of constraint
on sentencing bodies.
Nevertheless, the Court could have viewed its facial approval
of the Georgia, Florida, and Texas statutes 44 as merely the open40. 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 n.*
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
41. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3060-61 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
42. 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971), quoted in Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1055.
43. 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976), quoted in Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1056; accord Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) ("It is of
vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the
death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.").
44. See supra note 23.
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ing of a conversation with the states on the proper bounds of the
power to punish by execution. Endorsement of the formal features
of these guided discretion schemes need not have precluded the
Court from demanding careful application-and possibly, too, further refinement--of their largely untested provisions, so as to ensure that caprice had actually been curbed in practice. 45
Whatever results one might have envisioned for such an attempt, seriously engaged in, barely any was made at all. While
the Court initially disapproved a few statutes found to operate arbitrarily (one of them Georgia's own "vileness" aggravating circumstance, held vague as applied to the facts of an unexceptional
domestic murder 46), in the early eighties it virtually abandoned
the first of its stated twin objectives. Accepting claims of capricious sentencing only on the rarest occasions, 47 the Court has rejected substantial challenges along those lines. A full chronicle of
this retreat from the aim of significant regulation is beyond the
scope of the present piece. I will, therefore, list merely a selected
number of pertinent holdings: (1) proportionality review of death
sentences is not required; 48 (2) a jury may be instructed about the
Governor's power to commute a sentence of life without parole;49

45. See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 & n.46 (suggesting that a capital system
might have standards too vague to channel discretion sufficiently to meet Furman's demands); Weisberg, supra note 33, at 318-19 ("romantic" account of 1976 cases implied
this approach).
46. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). The aggravating circumstance in question covered an "offense that 'was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.'" Id. at
422 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447

U.S. 625, 643 (1980) (ban on jury's considering any lesser included offenses, in the context
of a seemingly mandatory death penalty law, invalidated because it injected an intolerable
"level of uncertainty and unreliability" into capital fact-finding process).
47. E.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (vacating death sentence based
in part on felony conviction that was later overturned); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356, 363-64 (1988) (in reliance on Godfrey, Court invalidated Oklahoma's aggravating
factor that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"); Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987) (forbidding victim impact evidence at penalty trials).
Booth was overruled on the final day of the past Term. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.
Ct. 2597 (1991). Further, in the 1989 Term, the Court upheld Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance against a Godfrey-Cartwright attack on
seemingly much less stringent scrutiny than had been applied in the prior cases. See infra
text accompanying note 51.
48. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). The Gregg plurality had extolled the virtues of such review. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206; supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
49. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983). But see id. at 1018-22 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (because instruction invites jury to speculate about possiblity of defendant's
release, which is unknowable, it creates unacceptable risk of arbitrary imposition of death).
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(3) a state may continue to run a capital system shown by a
study, assumed valid, to be tainted by racial discrimination; 50 (4)
Arizona's "especially heinous" aggravating circumstance passes
constitutional muster despite the Arizona Supreme Court's very
broad construction of the underlying definitional terms;5 1 and (5)
the lone aggravating factor validly supporting the penalty phase
verdict of death may duplicate an element of first-degree murder,
of which the defendant had already been convicted at the trial on
52
guilt.
Perhaps most critically, Zant v. Stephens,5" an opaque decision upholding a sentence based in part on a subsequently invalidated aggravating factor, removed all doubt that the minimalist
interpretation of Gregg is in fact the correct one. 54 Specifically,
the Court made plain that "guidance" need play no role in selecting actual defendants to die, as opposed to simply limiting the
group from which the unfortunate would be chosen.55 To avoid the
pattern of arbitrary penalties condemned in Furman, the state
need only provide for the finding of an aggravating circumstance
that "genuinely narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty and . . . reasonably justif[ies] the imposition of a
more severe sentence on the defendant as compared to others
found guilty of murder. ' 56 Californiav. Ramos, issued two weeks
subsequent to Stephens, underlined the decimation of the nonarbitrariness requirement:
[T]he constitutional prohibition on arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing determinations is not violated by a capital sentencing "scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be
imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the

50.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

51.

Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990); Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092

(1990). In both cases, Justice Blackmun filed detailed and stinging dissents. See Walton,

110 S. Ct. at 3070, 3076-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at 3104, 310514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988). But see id. at 256-57 (Marshall, J.,

dissenting) (this procedure mechanically narrows, but does not appropriately channel, sentencer's discretion).
53.
54.

462 U.S. 862 (1983).
See Weisberg, supra note 33, at 353.

55. See Stephens, 462 U.S. at 878; Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1083
(1990); Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244; see also Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1063.

56. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 877 (footnote omitted).
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class made eligible for that penalty by statute.

' 57

According to the Court, the important thing "at the selection
stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the char58
acter of the individual and the circumstances of the crime."
What an early scholarly work described as "guided individualization" 59 had thus turned into individualization modified by one
aggravating factor.60 Interestingly, the former California regime
upheld in McGautha would come very close to satisfying the procedural demands of the eighth amendment under existing barebones standards. While Gregg suggested that the Constitution
might mandate a separate penalty proceeding to maximize the
availability of all information pertinent to sentencing, and the
Woodson-Lockett line of authority requires that the sentencer be
permitted to consider all relevant mitigating proof, recall that
California's statute did bifurcate capital trials-and did not limit
mitigating evidence.6 " Justice Harlan, indeed, surmised that jurors
were taking into account "a variety of factors, many of which will
have been suggested by the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel."6 2 Hence, a cynic, or maybe a realist, might say
that the following formula captures the sum total of the distance
traveled in two decades of effort at fashioning a due process adequate for death:
McGautha (1971) + one aggravating circumstance = eighth
amendment (1991).63

57. 463 U.S. 992, 1008-09 n.22 (1983) (quoting Stephens, 462 U.S. at 875); see,
e.g., Gillers, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 17, at 1051 ("In the post-Furman era of
capital prosecutions, the arbitrariness criterion has minimal utility at the selection stage.").
58. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 879.
59. Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler
Plate". Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 773 (1978).

60. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 910-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. McGautha and his co-defendant, Wilkinson, each presented a mitigating case at
the penalty hearing. Wilkinson, whose evidence was more substantial, received life; McGautha got death. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 187-91.
62. Id. at 208. He was, however, discussing sentencing discretion in general, not the
California scheme in particular.
63. A slightly longer version of the formula might read: McGautha (1971) + one
aggravating circumstance + "meaningful appellate review" = eighth amendment (1991).
The quoted phrase draws decisional support from Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731, 739
(1991). See also id. at 742 (White, J., dissenting). Yet another variation is: Crampton
(1971) + one aggravating circumstance + a separate penalty trial (+ meaningful appellate review) = eighth amendment (1991). See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
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C. A New Direction: Furman's Empire Resurrected?
It remains only to record briefly the Court's recently renewed
flirtation with guided discretion, which comes in a different guise
than before. Previous attacks on perceived caprice in capital sentencing-which, as we saw, met little success-were advanced by
defendants, who targeted either systemic flaws or aberrational
rules or sanctions that allegedly undermined evenhandedness.
When defendants mounted challenges based on a violation of the
Woodson-Lockett requirement of individualization, contending
that the sentencer had been prevented from fully considering or
giving effect to the mitigating case, it was states' attorneys who
argued that accepting such claims would lead to pre-Furman
un64
bridled discretion; and they, too, were unsuccessful.
But now the Court has trained its focus on the mitigation side
of the scales. In the 1989 Term, a bare majority of the justices
circled the wagons around Lockett. The Chief Justice proclaimed
that the requisite of individualized determinations "is satisfied by
allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence."'65
Beyond this baseline, no constitutional rule calls for "unfettered
sentencing discretion, . . . and States are free to structure and

shape consideration of mitigating evidence 'in an effort to achieve
a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.' "6 Applying that approach (expressly rejected by five justices a year earlier)," the Court upheld so-called quasi-mandatory
laws in California and Pennsylvania, which directed the jury to
impose death if aggravation outweighed mitigation 68 or no mitigation at all was found." A similar statute in Arizona had the effect

64. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) ("Rather than creating
the risk of an unguided emotional response, full consideration of evidence that mitigates

against the death penalty is essential if the jury is to give a .....
reasoned moral response to
the defendant's background, character, and crime.'"") (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487
U.S. 164, 184, reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1263 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring))) (emphasis in
original).
65. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083 (1990) (emphasis added); see
Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1196 (1990) (quoting Blystone).
66. Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1196 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181

(1988) (plurality opinion)).
67. Compare Penry, 492 U.S. at 319-28 (O'Connor, J.), with id. at 354-60 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's defection from the old majority on this issue cemented a
new one.
68. Boyde, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990).
69. Blystone, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990).
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of compelling death even if the sentencing authority believed that
the aggravating and mitigating factors were equally balanced. The
Court sustained both this provision and one placing the burden on
the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
circumstances .sufficiently substantial to
existence of mitigating
70
call for leniency.
Only time will tell if flirtation shades into romance, and the
Court more globally embraces the notion of trumping Woodson
and Lockett with Furman. Justice Scalia charted that path by announcing in Walton v. Arizona7l that he would no longer vote to
uphold a "claim that the sentencer's discretion has been unlawfully restricted. 7 2 In other words, he was frankly discarding the
second of the twin objectives of capital sentencing. His reasons for
creating a potential earthquake in modern capital jurisprudence
expose the fault line that has been widening beneath its surface
from the beginning. This broader subject will constitute the final
chapter in my history.
D.

Seismic Tension, Doctrinal Cave-in

The dilemma is quite simply stated. Gregg purported to solve
73
the problems of arbitrariness and inequality exposed in Furman

70. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990). But see id. at 3075 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that the statute establishes an unconstitutional "'presumption of
death' "). In addition, dictum in Saffie v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990), strongly suggested
that an antisympathy instruction challenged by Parks would have been upheld if the Court
had based its decision on the merits instead of on retroactivity doctrine. Parks had argued
that the penalty charge "[Y]ou must avoid any influence of sympathy. . . or other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence" may have led the jury to believe that it had to ignore
the mitigating evidence, which was designed to arouse sympathy. Id. at 1259, 1262. Giving
short shrift to this contention (and mischaracterizing the defendant's claim), id. at 1265
(Brennan, J., dissenting), five justices stated that Lockett addresses only "what mitigating
evidence the jury must be permitted to consider," not "how it must consider the mitigating
evidence." Id. at 1261 (emphasis in original). The majority made clear that the states
would henceforth enjoy great latitude in structuring the "how," if not the "what." Id. at
1262-63. But cf. McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990) (reaffirming rule of
Mills-which arguably restricts the "how"-that states may not require unanimous jury
finding of a mitigating factor as condition to individual juror's weighing that factor in his
or her final decision-arguably, a "how" decision); Weisberg, A Great Writ While It
Lasted, 81 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 31 n.135 (1990) (characterizing McKoy as a
decision concerned with "processing" mitigating evidence rather than with admission of
such evidence).
71. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
72. Id. at 3068 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
73. 408 U.S. 239, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (death penalty is wantonly
and freakishly imposed); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (there is no meaningful basis

1080

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1067

by calling on the states to do what Justice Harlan in McGautha
deemed impossible: identify before the fact rational criteria constraining the decision maker's judgment. 7 4 Doing so required (at
least, theoretically) greater formality, evenhandedness, and objectivity in capital sentencing. Yet simultaneously, Woodson enshrined the primacy of individualization, and Lockett and its
progeny obliged the states to admit virtually any evidence offered
by defendants as a basis for mercy. That mandate, in turn, entailed a wholesale retreat from categorization and generalization
in favor of discretion, "unique" treatment, 5 and (arguably) rampant subjectivity. To switch metaphors in midstream, the Court's
dual sentencing objectives strongly resemble Siamese
twins-locked at the hip but straining uncomfortably in opposite
76
directions.
Several rationales have been advanced in an effort to reconcile this disharmony, none of which is very persuasive. The foremost attempts to tie the permissible level of discretion in capital
sentencing to an ostensible distinction between a decision for
death and one for life: "In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's discretion to impose the
death sentence, the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow
a sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might
'77 Not surpriscause it to decline to impose the death sentence.
ingly, Justice Stevens, author of the Stephens7a opinion endorsing
almost McGautha-like formlessness in the ultimate selection of
sentence, has been the leading judicial proponent of the view that
unconstitutional caprice may be avoided by guiding jurors merely
in their threshold determination of whether a defendant is eligible
to die-even if they then have "complete discretion to show mercy

for distinguishing the few cases in which death is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not); id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (operation of wholly discretionary statutes is
"pregnant with discrimination").
74.

See supra text accompanying note 42; McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305

(1987).
75. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
76.

See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3063 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring);

see also Weisberg, supra note 33, at 327 ("A person cannot be both 'unique' and
'equal.' ").

77. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 304 (emphasis in original). "That is, a jury has
unfettered discretion not to impose the death penalty, but its discretion to impose a death
sentence must be guided." Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at

1057-58 (emphasis in original).
78.

462 U.S. 862 (1983).
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when evaluating the individual characteristics" of such a person. 9
But Justice Scalia convincingly exposes this position as a rationalization by pointing out that the penalty choice is a unitary one8"
and, further, that giving different sentences to murderers within a
small pool of perpetrators of comparable crimes may actually
make results more freakish."a
If the tension between sentencing goals cannot in fact be
eliminated, presumably the Court should choose to adhere to at
least one of them. Justice Scalia said he would follow the principle
of nonarbitrariness because he believed that Furman perhaps derives support from the wording of the eighth amendment while
acWoodson and Lockett were "another matter." In any event,
's2
cording to him, these decisions "had no basis in Furman.
Whatever the merits of the textual assertion, the last of these
statements seems dubious at best. After all, ensuring that the jury

may consider the defendant's character and record and the circumstances of his offense, as required by the Woodson-Lockett
line, enhances sentencing rationality. Both mitigating and aggravating factors focus the jurors on information relevant to penalty,
thereby eradicating that part of pre-Furman caprice inherent in
decision making founded on less than full information.8 3 Currently, however, arbitrariness consisting not of too little informa-

79. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3089-92 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
80. Id. at 3058-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
81. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Others previously had made that point. See, e.g., Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, supra note
17, at 27-28. It has also been noted that Gregg condemned only a "substantialrisk" of
caprice and "wholly arbitrary and capricious action," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
188-89 (1976) (emphasis added), and that the criminal law generally throws the risk of
error on the state, not the defendant. Neither observation helps to resolve the tension between the competing goals of nonarbitrariness and individualized treatment. The first does
no more than suggest the obvious: that no system can operate perfectly. It hardly explains
why differentiating among a narrower, more similar group of convicted murderers with
respect to sentence is less capricious than doing so among a larger group of less comparable
killers, or is acceptable in absolute rather than relative terms. In any event, one can cite a
number of places where the Gregg plurality refers to the concept of arbitrariness without
using weakening modifiers. Id. at 194-95, 206. The second, in attempting to justify unguided discretion only on the side of mercy, presupposes a way of knowing whether a death
sentence is "erroneous"--a dubious assumption. More important, it simply fails to address
the complaint of systemic caprice (which is not identical to error in a specific case) in a
context in which the sentencer will inevitably have very broad discretion.
82. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3062, 3066-67 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
83. See supra text accompanying note 21; Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, supra note
17, at 29-30.
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tion but, instead, too much-in the absence of guidance about
how to weigh such disparate particulars as the defendant's abused
childhood, drug addiction, loving family, and lack of any criminal
history 4-infects the sentence-determining process at its core.
When everything counts, as it does under Lockett, nothing is dispositive, 85 and subjectivity (although not pure irrationality) holds
sway, as it did prior to Furman.
In light of that problem, it is unsurprising that the Court did
emphasize one of its goals over the other for a number of years.
Further, because individualization represents a more achievable
aim than limiting capriciousness,86 it was also quite predictable
that the former would trump the latter. Yet Justice Scalia chose
to discard the Woodson-Lockett doctrinal prong after the Court
had already abandoned serious concern for the principle of
Furman and ignored the broader implications of Gregg. Simultaneously, a majority of justices started to chip away at this prong.
Since they show no renewed dedication to reducing elements of
caprice (except for those intrinsic to individualization), they now
compromise both objectives.
No amount of real or perceived incompatibility between the
goals warrants that nihilistic course. ,Thus, the 1976 framework
has collapsed in substance, if not in form, not only because of its
subsurface flaws but also because of the present Court's commitment to regulating capital sentencing solely in superficial ways,
with an eye to results rather than process.
II.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO REDUCE CAPRICE IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING AND IMPROVE JURY PERFORMANCE

In the previous section, I sought to prove that arbitrariness
necessarily inheres in post-Furman sentencing schemes. The
84. See Berger, Rolling the Dice to Decide Who Dies, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1988, at
32, 36-37. See generally Stephens, 462 U.S. at 875 n.13 (the Court has never mandated
specific standards for balancing aggravating and mitigating factors); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 257-58 (1976) (state law need not assign specific weights to any of these

factors).
85. Nonstatutory aggravating factors, where these are admissible (as, for example, in
the Georgia scheme upheld in Gregg), only add to the problem of virtually boundless sentencing discretion.
86. See Berger, Born-Again Death, supra note 13, at 1303-12 (recognizing the
Court's trend towards personalized punishment at the expense of even-handed sentencing

and offering several reasons for this phenomenon, including the focus of modem penology
on "gearing the penalty to the character and record of the offender as well as to the nature
of the offense.").
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switch to "guided individualization" '8 7 in the Gregg quintet simply
altered the nature, not the fact, of the defect. That being so, eliminating or severely curtailing the role of juries-which Judge Higginbotham views as vital to doing away with perceived caprice 8A-would merely paper over the problem.89
Juries and the Death Penalty proffers its thesis of jury "incompetence" in both a strong and a weak version. The former propounds a theory that jurors' deliberative processes almost defy
control by the court through "instructions and other such devices
designed to restrain or guide the jury's discretion."90 The latter,
more defensibly (and more consonant with tradition), asserts that
"practical limits" restrict the degree of attainable control over juries. Yet in advancing that incontestable proposition, the judge admits he has found jurors "faithful to realistic instructions" 9' 1 and
able to avoid "technical traps. ' 92 Wherever he comes out, however, Judge Higginbotham clearly is less optimistic than I about
the potential for jury guidance.
If the death penalty is to be tolerated in this country, we
ought to err on the side of attempting to improve the established
jury-based systems rather than ditching juries for judges or, in
effect, throwing in the towel by insisting that we can and should
do nothing short of abolishing capital punishment.93 For many of
the reasons given by the judge, 94 I believe that juries perform an

87. See supra text accompanying note 59.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12 & 15-16. While not firmly concluding
that courts ought to supplant sentencing juries, Judge Higginbotham does seem to beliive
that capriciousness cannot be lessened to a meaningful extent without decreased dependence on juries.
89. Cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976) (making the same
point with regard to mandatory death penalties). Indeed, at least once, the judge apparently concedes this point. See Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1,
at 1058 ("oxymoronic" aspect of guided discretion requirement is "an inevitable by-product" of insistence on individualized sentencing).
90. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1051.
91. Id. at 1065.
92. Id. at 1066. The judge also notes the presumption that jurors follow the court's
instructions. Id. at 1065-66.
93. This is not to denigrate persons, unlike me, whose opposition to capital punishment leads them to forego efforts to ameliorate it. But I do fault the growing willingness of
nonabolitionists-especially Justices of the Supreme Court-to accept capriciousness, inequality, and other extremely serious flaws in the death penalty on the ground that "'there
can be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases. . . to impose death."' See, e.g.,
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
884 (1983) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978))).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
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invaluable function in the criminal process and, in particular, in
making the life-or-death decision. 5 In addition, for reasons I will
now explain, I do not think that increased judicial involvement in
sentencing would substantially reduce caprice; indeed, such a shift
might even augment it.
Instead, in direct opposition to Juries and the Death Penalty,
which claims that "McGautha's vision of the sentencing jury was
sound" and that the enterprise of guided discretion can be "easily
overdone, ' 96 I argue that the venture has in fact been considerably "underdone." In other words, we should focus more on limiting capriciousness than has the Court in structuring capital
schemes overall and mandating (or, at least, encouraging) more
detailed penalty instructions than prevail under current practice. I
now turn to a brief development of these thoughts, leaving their
further elaboration to a forum suited to greater expansiveness.
A.

Two Fallacies

Assumptions about the comparative advantage of judicial
sentencing in decreasing arbitrariness in capital cases and the imperviousness of jurors to all but minimal judicial guidance undergird the author's approach in Juries and the Death Penalty. As
stated above, these notions appear exaggerated.
On the one hand, penalty decision making by courts frequently lacks the virtues asserted in its behalf.9 7 Whatever the
merits of professionalism in the usual sentencing context,9 8 the
rarity of occasions on which a given judge will have to choose between life and death militates against the development of either
expertise or internal consistency in the jurist's approach to this
task. 99 While the Proffitt v. Florida plurality opined that sentencing by the court would advance those objectives, 10 0 experience has
95. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. See generally Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 467 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (advocating constitutional right to jury sentencing in capital cases, in context of judicial override of jury recommendation of life).
96. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1056 (emphasis
added).

97. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)
(claiming virtues for capital sentencing by the court, including less influence of emotion
and prejudice and more equality and rationality).
98.

See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, supra note 17, at 57; see also AMERICAN BAR

ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES

§

18-1.1 (1979) (recommending abolition of jury sentencing in noncapital cases).
99. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, supra note 17, at 58-59 (citing statistics).
100. 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).
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failed to support that prediction.10 1 In addition, uniformity among
judges has proved to be equally elusive. The rampant disparities in
ordinary sentencing, absent guidelines, are indisputable.10 2 Capital
penalty determinations, although posing a unitary choice or a very
limited set of alternatives, 0 3 do not conduce to greater consistency. First, no more for judges than for juries does the Constitution require specific standards to govern the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. 4 Second, the uniquely moral and
emotional nature of the capital sentencing decision virtually ensures that not only jurors but also judges will inject very personal
considerations into their verdicts. 0 5 Indeed, truly idiosyncratic

views should prevail less often in jury sentencing. 06 Judges, finally, have no immunity from racial prejudice, which poses an especially grave risk of arbitrariness in capital cases. 07

101. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 477 n.17 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is doubtful that judicial sentencing has
worked to reduce the level of capital sentencing disparity; if anything, the evidence in override cases suggests that the jury reaches the appropriate result more often than does the
judge.").
102. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 98, § 18-3.1 commentary at 187-88 &
nn.l-2.
103. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE. ANN. § 2929.03(D) (Anderson 1987) (sentencer has
choice of death, life with parole eligibility after thirty years, or life with parole eligibility
after twenty years).
104. See supra note 84. Nor have states voluntarily opted to impose'such standards.
Furthermore, appellate review of sentences for arbitrariness or disproportion, where it exists, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35 (1990), applies to determinations by juries as
well as courts.
105. See, e.g., Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948 & n.6 (1983); id. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to the trial judge's "candid exposition of his deeply felt
concern about racial crimes"). See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 499 (1966) ("We know, of course, that on the side of the judge too, discretion, freedom, and sentiment will be at work, and that the judge too is human.").
106. Cf. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1048 (the
only check on the jury's "irreducible discretion" is its representative character).
107. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986); Lewis, Committee Rejects Bush
Nominee To Key Appellate Court in South, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1991, at Al, col. I
(Senate Judiciary Committee rejected nomination of District Judge Kenneth L. Ryskamp
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on grounds of insensitivity
to minorities). Recently, faced with a motion to disqualify based on asserted racial bias, a
Georgia judge recused himself in the retrial of William Anthony Brooks, a capital defendant. Although such action hardly proves the existence of prejudice, Brooks's lawyers believe
that this judge voluntarily withdrew in order to avoid the embarrassment that a factual
inquiry would have occasioned. Telephone interviews with George Kendall of the NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., attorney for defendant Brooks (Apr. 9 & Apr.
12, 1991).
Where judges are elected (as is typical), political pressures may also affect them,
skewing their verdicts against leniency. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 475 n.14,
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On the other hand, carefully crafted penalty instructions may

well hold greater promise for generally improving jury performance in this area-and, in particular, diminishing caprice-than
Judge Higginbotham concedes. If so, reforming the slipshod ap-

proach to charging that currently prevails in many jurisdictions
would amount to one means of promoting sentencing rationality. I
discuss this suggestion in the last subsection, which deals with recommendations for change.
B.

Toward Less Arbitrary Sentences of Death
1. Better Penalty Phase Instructions

While lawyers frequently doubt that jurors understand the
finer points of the court's charge or sometimes even its fundamentals,108 and have a basis for this opinion, 109 social scientists have
demonstrated that lay comprehension of legal terms can be enhanced significantly by discarding verbose and inscrutable language in favor of normal English usage.110 Since it is probable
that jurors debating life and death largely treat their difficult task
with appropriate seriousness, 1

one can assume that they, above

all, ordinarily try to follow instructions as best they can. 1 2 Ac488 n.34 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although a bias in
favor of death, however undesirable, does not inherently amount to caprice, it may operate
arbitrarily with respect to particular defendants: for instance, those whose trials take place
close to elections or whose alleged crimes have incurred more than the usual amount of
publicity.
108. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 181 (1930) ("every day,
cases which have taken weeks to try are reversed . . . because a phrase or a sentence,
meaningless to the jury, has been included in or omitted from the judge's charge").
109. See Kassin & Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof. The Timing of Judicial Instructions and Mock Juror Verdicts, in IN THE JURY Box at 143, 144-45 (L.
Wrightsman, S. Kassin & C. Willis eds. 1987).
110. The broad topic of methods of improving jury performance, through better instructions and otherwise, lies well beyond the scope of this piece. For a sample of the vast
literature just on instructions, see Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable:A PsycholinguisticStudy of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306 (1979);
Elwork, Alfini & Sales, Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, in IN THE JURY Box,
supra note 109, at 161; Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 153 (1982). See generally Wilcox, The Movement for Better Jury Instructions:A Selected, Annotated Bibliography for Lawyers, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 457 (1987) (citations selected for lawyers
unfamiliar with the literature and not expert in the social sciences).
111. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985); McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971).
112. Studies based on simulated jury deliberations have shown that, at least in controlled settings, jurors in general perform conscientiously. R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N.
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cordingly, if the judge and the parties endeavor to guide juries
meaningfully instead of minimally, the charge delivered at the
sentencing phase does not need to "look, or . . . function very
much like" the empty instructions approved in McGautha.113
Unfortunately, the defense, which usually has more to gain
than the prosecution from clear and meticulous penalty directives, 4 often neglects to make pertinent requests to charge or to
challenge the instructions given. 11 5 The Supreme Court has, to be
sure, tended to look unfavorably upon defendants' claims of sins of
omission and commission in this context (as in others) in recent
years. 1"6 Many particular charges, however, though not required
on pain of reversal, are useful enough to warrant routine inclusion
by the court in the charge as a whole. Yet because trial judges
rarely display great initiative---especially on behalf of defendants,
in the unfamiliar capital settingl 17-- the burden falls on defense
counsel to suggest ways in which the court can improve the guidance received by the jurors.
Sophisticated capital lawyers, such as those who work full
time for death penalty resource centers or the Southern Center for
Human Rights, routinely seek and occasionally obtain elaborate
sentencing phase instructions. 1 8 Thus, for example, counsel submit painstakingly thorough requests to charge with respect to various mitigating factors, statutory and nonstatutory, alleged to exist in the case at hand. They also press for narrow definitions of
facially broad aggravating circumstances and, where possible, at-

PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 27-28 (1983). Although purposeful nullification may still

occur in death sentence cases, the elimination of mandatory capital punishment should
have reduced this phenomenon greatly. See supra note 30.
113. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1053-54 (quot-

ing McGautha instructions on sentence).
114. See Ellmann, Instructions on Death: Guiding the Jury's Discretion in Capital
Cases, CHAMPION, Apr. 1986, at 20, 20.

115.

For sources discussing the fact and causes of counsel ineffectiveness, sadly en-

demic in capital cases, see Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?, supra note 13, at

1670 n.25.
116. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); supra note 70 (discussing
dictum in Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990)). But see McKoy v. North Carolina, 110

S. Ct. 1227 (1990) (constrained by Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
117. See supra text accompanying note 99.

118. Many of these instructions are set out in Ellmann, supra note 114. In addition,
the following discussion draws on both my general knowledge and on instructions at the
sentencing trials of William Anthony Brooks in Georgia, see supra note 107, and William

James Gladden in North Carolina.
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tempt to exclude nonstatutory ones. Typically, too, they ask for
specific helpful instructions such as that the defendant will not be
parole eligible for many years (or sometimes, ever) 119 and general
injunctions (often enhanced by repetition) such as that the jury
may spare the defendant's life even in the absence of
mitigation. 2
Admittedly, not all instructions beyond the boilerplate aim
primarily to lessen the danger of arbitrariness in capital sentencing; many tend, rather, to reduce an impermissible risk of inaccuracy in executions. While categorization of particular charges
along these lines may at times be difficult, 12 1 some do plainly curtail caprice or increase evenhandedness wholly apart from benefiting individual defendants. 12 2 In addition, through tone and emphasis as well as substance, comprehensive penalty instructions "help
set the mood" for deliberations. 2 3 Judge Higginbotham in fact
concedes their importance "as ritualistic reminders of the jury's
responsibility.'1 24 I agree, but I go farther--concluding that more
consistent attention to the oft-neglected sentencing charge would
25
centrally serve the goal of Furman.

119. This highly controversial charge has tremendous significance in influencing jurors to impose life. See Paduano & Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 281, 330-31
(1991); Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in
the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. Rs. L. REV. 211 (1987).
120. In some states, however, the sentencer may not have this power. See supra text
accompanying notes 68-70.
121. The relationship between "arbitrariness" and "inaccuracy"---each in itself a
complicated notion in the setting of penalty determinations-is problematic. See, e.g., Gillers, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 17, at 1041-43 (noting some overlap between arbitrariness and inaccuracy).
122. One example would be an instruction that the defendant may not be paroled.
See supra text accompanying note 119. This would foreclose speculation on the subject,
with its attendant threat of caprice. Cf. supra note 49 (Ramos decision, inviting jurors to
speculate about the possibility of commutation, creates a risk of arbitrary infliction of
death). Another example might be a charge not to consider the victim's character in aggravation or mitigation of the offense. Cf. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 (1987) (rejecting contention that deceased's personal characteristics properly bear on decision to impose life or death). But cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (overruling Booth
and allowing consideration of victim impact evidence). Notably, the latter type of instruction would help the state in the case of a victim of dubious character-but would, at the
same time, steer the jury away from reliance on arbitrary factors.
123. See Ellmann, supra note 114, at 20.
124. - Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1065.
125.

408 U.S. 239 (1972).
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Other Means of Curbing Caprice

I now proceed to deal directly with the program for reform
sketched in Juries and the Death Penalty, insofar as I understand
it. On the one hand, as stated earlier, 126 the judge recommends
that the trial court should perhaps identify death-eligibles as a
"threshold determinant[] to the submission of the ultimate question to the jury. 1 27 That course would presumably call for the
court to find the presence of at least one statutory aggravating
factor and the existence of the minimum culpability level established in Enmund v. Florida128 and Tison v. Arizona.1 29 On the
other hand, he then proposes that the penalty decision be made by
the court or by the jury, but not by both 13 0-- an apparently contradictory stance. In opposition to Clemons v. Mississippi,131 the
judge further contends that we should not allow appellate courts
to fix punishment by independently weighing the evidence after a
flawed initial sentencing. 3 2 Lastly, he states that "the most effective means of guiding a jury rests with efforts to sequence its decisional process, such as the method employed in Zant v. Stephens,
or narrowing the definition of capital murder."13 3
Space limitations preclude all but a few brief comments on
Judge Higginbotham's conclusions, and mention of one or two
more of my own. First, for the reasons elaborated on throughout
this piece, I disagree that the trial court instead of the jury should
make death-eligibility findings. As the judge himself recognizes
dividing up the sentencing function is undesirable. He also admits

126. See supra text accompanying note 9.
127. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1065. Such a
scheme would not violate the defendant's right to a jury trial. See supra note 17.
128. 458 U.S. 782 (1982); see Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra
note 1, at 1061 (quoting Enmund's holding that death may not be imposed on a felony-

murderer "who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take[] place,
or that lethal force will be employed.").
129.

481 U.S. 137 (1987). Tison lowered the Enmund "floor" to permit execution of

a major participant in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to life.
130. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1065. Perhaps
he is implicitly commenting on judicial override schemes. See infra text accompanying note
136. To that extent, his views would not be inconsistent.
131. 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990). Judge Higginbotham errs in saying that the Court
"declined to upset Clemons's death sentence." Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Pen-

alty, supra note 1, at 1063. In fact, the Court vacated the judgment of the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirming the defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings.
Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1452.
132. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1062.
133. Id. at 1066.
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that the inquiries underlying such findings are integral to the jurors' task.134 Yet he proffers his "threshold" approach in the teeth
of those insights, seemingly because of his incorrect view that the
jury system creates the problem of arbitrariness."3 5 Not surprisingly, wrong diagnoses lead to prescriptions that do not cure.
Second, sharing the judge's preference for a single site of decision-making power and believing that this power should rest
with juries, I would not countenance schemes like Florida's that
permit judicial override of jury recommendations of life.' 36 Third,
I absolutely endorse Judge Higginbotham's rejection of Clemons
and similar cases.137 While legislators might reasonably assign the
function of determining the penalty to judges, no system locates it
initially in appellate courts-which are "'wholly ill-suited'" to
the role. 3 1 That being so, the mere convenience of averting another penalty trial when error has infected the first proceeding
fails to justify the reallocation of sentencing authority to a body
incompetent to discharge it.
Fourth, I concur with Juries and the Death Penalty that definitions of capital murder ought to be narrowed. The author does
not develop this final proposition or his alternative suggestion regarding sequencing the jurors' decisional process. As respects the

134. Id. at 1065.
135. See id.
136. The converse, judicial override of jury recommendations of death, might have
more to recommend it if trial courts employed their authority to curb perceived abuses of
discretion by the state in pursuing, or the jury in returning, a capital verdict. But at least in
Florida, which ranks second only to Texas in executions, see NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., supra note 3, at 5, and in death row population (298), see id. at
15, that prerogative is not exercised. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 475 n.14
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If there are any cases in
which the jury override procedure has worked to the defendant's advantage because the
trial judge rejected a jury's recommendation of death, they have not been brought to our
attention by the Attorney General of Florida ....
"). For academic commentary critical
of Florida's override scheme, see, e.g., Mello, The Jurisdiction to Do Justice: Florida's
Jury Override and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 923 (1991); Mello &
Robson, Judge or Jury: Florida'sPracticeof Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases,
13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31 (1985).
137. See, e.g., Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (appellate court may make
finding required by Enmund), discussed in Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty,
supra note 1, at 1061-62.
138. See Clemons, 110 U.S. at 1460 (Blackmun, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1985)). It should be
noted that Clemons's holding increases the importance to defense attorneys of getting correct sentencing instructions. Depending on the vagaries of state law, defendants may now
be deprived of a new trial as to penalty even where the charge was concededly tainted by
harmful error.
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latter, Judge Higginbotham's intent is unclear.139 So I will not
dwell on that recommendation except to note my reservations
about splitting a moral task into too many discrete parts, thereby
possibly implying to the jury that it can resolve the penalty dilemma through a purely mechanistic approach. 140 As respects the
former, notwithstanding the current absence of major constitutional constraints, 41 states should do away with such catch-all aggravating factors as heinousness 42 and felony murder14 -- which
barely distinguish death-eligible persons from the universe of all
murderers-as one means of constricting the class of persons exposed to execution. I stress, however, that unless and until the
Court insists on meaningful limits on selection of actual defendants to die, capital sentencing will remain unnecessarily wanton
and freakish.
CONCLUSION

Assertions by the Supreme Court of the need for rationality,
consistency, objectivity, and limitation of sentencer discretion in
the decision to impose death are as plentiful now as they ever
were.144 But actual holdings premised on the goal of avoiding arbitrary executions have become a form of endangered species, By
positing a false choice between reducing caprice and adhering to
traditional jury sentencing (which states will surely continue to
prefer), Judge Higginbotham has let the Court off the constitutional hook.
I do not, in part because I deem the jury a scapegoat for
more basic problems. Generally, however, the difficulty of procedurally policing the death penalty does not excuse the virtual
139. Unfortunately, the cryptic allusion to Stephens is not helpful to me. See Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, supra note 1, at 1063.
140. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 114, at 31 (the more rigidly the decision on mitigation is structured, "the less free jurors may feel to give appropriate weight to nonstatutory, even inarticulate, factors calling for life"); cf. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,
256-57 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (endorsing structured, "step-by-step" determination of appropriate penalty, but claiming that removal of narrowing function from sentencing phase reduces selection of life or death to "mechanical formality").
141. See supra text accompanying notes 46-63.
142. See Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L. REv. 941 (1986).
143. Enmund and Tison impose only slight limitations on the class of felony-murderers who may receive the death penalty. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
144. See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3059-61 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting many such statements).
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abandonment of the modest mission of Gregg. Whatever the validity of Justice Harlan's skepticism regarding the project of guided
discretion, as an original proposition, we have simply gone too far
to return to the vacuum of McGautha. Morally, the Court has
only two options: either to make serious attempts to curb capriciousness in capital punishment or frankly to pronounce the venture a failure and issue a definitive "Furman IL."145 Yet a majority of sitting justices favor neither, and are apparently disinclined
to map out new doctrinal paths. 4 ' Accordingly, for the foreseeable future, ideals of reason and evenhandedness will find much
fuller expression in dicta than in life-or-death determinations.

145. See Berger, Born-Again Death, supra note 13, at 1324.
146. But cf. text accompanying notes 71-72 (noting Justice Scalia's rejection of
Woodson-Lockett jurisprudence).

